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Executive Summary 1
Executive Summary
When it comes to health care, there are few magic-bullet solutions for the many problems consumers face 
in the marketplace: insurers don’t compete 
for their business, leading to higher prices 
and lower quality. Important information 
about coverage is buried in the fine print, 
making it hard to know what’s really cov-
ered or which plan is right. And costs are 
continuing their unsustainable rise.
Yet there are policy solutions that can 
make a difference and give consumers 
a better deal on health care. One of the 
most important of these is the creation of 
new state-based health insurance market-
places, called exchanges. These exchanges, 
authorized by 2010’s health reform law, 
offer the states the chance to address the 
twin problems of cost and quality, and help 
consumers get a fair shake when buying 
insurance. 
Exchanges give individuals and small 
businesses the same advantages that large 
businesses generally enjoy when it comes to 
buying health insurance. Large businesses 
have strong negotiating power, allowing 
them to get a lower rate for coverage as 
insurers compete for their business. They 
also benefit from economies of scale that 
lower administrative costs, and have so-
phisticated human resources departments 
and brokers at their disposal, making it 
easier for employees to understand their 
options and decide which plan is right for 
them.
In much the same way, exchanges give 
individuals and small businesses the ability 
to band together and gain the same benefits 
of size, negotiating power, and informa-
tion. By providing better options and better 
information, and negotiating on behalf of 
its enrollees, the exchange can level the 
playing field for consumers.
States thus have an important opportu-
nity to improve their health care market-
places through the creation of an exchange. 
And the health reform law gives the states 
substantial leeway to define critical aspects 
of the exchange, including who is eligible to 
buy coverage through it, how aggressively it 
will set standards and negotiate with insur-
ers, and who will run it. A weak exchange 
could wind up taking its cues from the 
insurance industry, not consumers, and do 
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little to shift the fundamental problems in 
most states’ health care markets. A strong 
exchange, though, can be just the tool 
states need to revolutionize their health 
care systems and improve quality while 
lowering costs.
As of this writing, several states have 
already taken this opportunity and es-
tablished their exchanges. But not all 
exchanges are created equal, and many 
states have yet to commit to establishing 
one. This report assesses the progress that 
the states have made, and for the states 
that have begun to set up their exchange, 
evaluates them on the myriad policies and 
criteria that will determine whether it is 
ultimately successful in improving health 
care for consumers.
Grading the Exchanges
Our scorecard breaks exchanges down into 
four major areas: first, the governance and 
overall structure of the exchange; second, 
the ability of the exchange to negotiate 
on behalf of consumers and drive lower 
rates and higher quality; third, the overall 
consumer experience and ease of use when 
searching for and buying coverage on the 
exchange; and fourth, the stability of the 
exchange and its protections against the 
risk of adverse selection.
Within governance, key policies include:
•	 Exchange	structure: the exchange 
should be an independent public 
agency, to maximize its flexibility and 
accountability.
•	 Board	makeup: the board should be 
run by consumers and their represen-
tatives, not the insurance industry.
•	 Conflicts	of	interest: board  
members should not make decisions 
that implicate their personal or finan-
cial interests.
•	 Size	of	the	exchange: the exchange 
should be open to larger businesses so 
more consumers can see its benefits.
•	 Stakeholder	input: consumers should 
be consulted as the exchange forms its 
policies.
For negotiating power and driving 
value, our criteria are:
•	 Active	purchasing: the exchange 
must have the power to negotiate with 
insurers and push them to deliver 
higher-value care.
•	 Delivery	and	payment	reforms: by 
promoting innovations like emphasiz-
ing primary care and paying for qual-
ity rather than quantity, the exchange 
can reduce premiums and improve 
value.
•	 Rate	review: the exchange should be 
integrated into the state’s rate review 
system.
•	 Standardization	of	products: to help 
make consumers’ choices more under-
standable, the exchange should be able 
to standardize plan offerings.
Important points for the consumer ex-
perience include:
•	 Navigators: exchange Navigators will 
help consumers choose and enroll 
in coverage; they should have strong 
relationships with communities with 
a high number of potential enrollees, 
and the program should not be limited 
to brokers.
•	 Rating	tools: the exchange website 
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should provide robust tools to allow 
consumers to make apples to apples 
comparisons and pick the plan that’s 
right for them.
•	 Eligibility	and	enrollment	systems: 
applicants to the exchange should 
experience a seamless eligibility 
determination process, and if they’re 
eligible for other public programs, 
they should be automatically enrolled 
in them instead.
•	 Privacy	protections: the exchange 
must safeguard the personal informa-
tion of enrollees.
•	 Language	access: exchange materi-
als must be available in the primary 
languages spoken by enrollees.
To ensure the exchange remains stable, 
states must take these actions:
•	 Ongoing	monitoring: to protect 
the exchange from adverse selection, 
which would make the exchange’s risk 
pool sicker and more expensive than 
the outside market, the exchange must 
monitor the danger and recommend 
legislation if necessary.
•	 Prohibitions	on	steering: to prevent 
insurers or brokers from segregating 
high-risk enrollees onto the exchange, 
the state should prevent steering.
•	 Restrictions	on	off-exchange	plans: 
limiting the availability of high-de-
ductible “catastrophic” plans off the 
exchange, and requiring high-benefit 
products to be offered both on and 
off the exchange, allows the state to 
mitigate the risk of adverse selection.
•	 Financing: ensuring that fees apply 
to all insurance plans in the state will 
State	 Governance	 Negotiating	 Consumer	 Stability	 Total		 Percentage	 Final	
	 and	 Power	and	 Experience	 	 Score	 of	Available	 Grade
	 Structure	 Driving	Value	 	 	 	 Points
California	 21	of	25	 13	of	30	 12	of	25	 8	of	15	 54	of	95	 57%	 B+
Colorado	 9	of	22	 3	of	15	 N/S	 N/S	 12	of	37	 32%	 C	*
Connecticut	 21	of	22	 13	of	30	 12	of	25	 5	of	15	 51	of	92	 55%	 B+
Hawaii	 5	of	22	 3	of	15	 7	of	10	 1	of	2	 16	of	49	 41%	 C	
Maryland	 21	of	22	 3	of	5	 4	of	10	 1	of	2	 29	of	39	 74%	 A	*
Massachusetts	 13	of	25	 16	of	20	 15	of	20	 N/S	 44	of	65	 68%	 A-
Nevada	 8	of	25	 N/S	 N/S	 N/S	 8	of	25	 32%	 C	*
Oregon	 15	of	25	 14	of	30	 11	of	25	 2	of	15	 42	of	95	 44%	 B-
Rhode	Island	 14	of	25	 24	of	30	 5	of	25	 2	of	15	 45	of	95	 47%	 B	
Vermont	 5	of	9	 23	of	30	 12	of	25	 0	of	8	 40	of	72	 56%	 B+
Washington	 17	of	22	 3	of	5	 N/S	 N/S	 20	of	27	 74%	 A	*
West	Virginia	 11	of	25	 3	of	5	 N/S	 N/S	 14	of	30	 47%	 B	*
States	with	asterisks	next	to	their	grades	have	been	assessed	on	criteria	worth	half	or	less	of	all	available	scorecard	
points.	Typically,	this	is	because	their	legislation	sets	up	governance	and	structure	only,	and	contemplates	future	
state	action;	we	have	accordingly	not	rated	them	on	criteria	their	laws	do	not	address.	Thus,	their	grades	should	be	
considered	highly	provisional.
Table	1.	State	Exchange	Scorecard.
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mean neither insurers nor consum-
ers will have an incentive to avoid the 
exchange.
Twelve states have so far established 
exchanges with sufficient detail to allow 
us to score them using these criteria. Table 
One details our findings—different states 
have pursued different models, each with 
their own strengths and weaknesses, and 
states that have yet to take action have a 
variety of examples to look to in craft-
ing an exchange that will work best for 
them. 
Getting an Incomplete
Beyond these twelve, many other states 
have yet to take action to create their 
exchange, giving them an Incomplete on 
our scorecard—they have not yet made the 
decisions necessary to judge whether or not 
their exchange will be pro-consumer—or, 
indeed, whether the state itself will run the 
exchange, or if the federal government will 
step in to establish it. 
In general, most states are pursuing the 
creation of their own exchange, or at least 
are exploring the tradeoffs of running it 
themselves as against leaving its operation 
to the federal government. Only two states 
appear to have entirely rejected the idea 
of creating an exchange—Louisiana and 
Florida—while twelve other states have 
officially expressed their intent to create a 
state exchange, or created a formal study 
committee to weigh their options.
There will be many policy decisions that 
must be made, and much infrastructure 
that must be created, to ensure that the 
exchange is open and ready to do business 
in 2014. With the states that have already 
taken action providing a guide to the re-
maining states, it’s past time for those that 
have yet to set up their exchange to get the 
ball rolling.
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When it comes to health care, there are few magic-bullet solutions for the many problems consumers face 
in the marketplace: insurers don’t compete 
for their business, leading to higher prices 
and lower quality. Important information 
about coverage is buried in the fine print, 
making it hard to know what’s really cov-
ered or which plan is right. And costs are 
continuing their unsustainable rise, with 
premiums for employer-sponsored cover-
age rising between 8 and 9 percent over 
the course of 2010.1 Nationally, the great 
majority of individual-market policyhold-
ers— 77% —saw a premium increase from 
early 2009 to early 2010, with an average 
rate hike of 20%.2 
Yet there are policy solutions that can 
make a difference and give consumers 
a better deal on health care. One of the 
most important of these is the creation of 
new state-based health insurance market-
places, called exchanges. These exchanges, 
authorized by 2010’s health reform law, 
offer the states the chance to address the 
twin problems of cost and quality, and help 
consumers get a fair shake when buying 
insurance. 
In principle, exchanges are a simple idea: 
they give individuals and small businesses 
the same advantages that large businesses 
generally enjoy when it comes to buying 
health insurance. Large businesses have 
strong negotiating power, allowing them 
to get a lower rate for coverage as insur-
ers compete for their business. They also 
benefit from economies of scale that lower 
administrative costs, and have sophisti-
cated human resources departments and 
brokers at their disposal, to make it easier 
for employees to understand their options 
and decide which plan is right for them.
In much the same way, exchanges give 
individuals and small businesses the ability 
to band together and gain the same benefits 
of size, negotiating power, and informa-
tion. By providing better options and better 
information, and negotiating on behalf of 
its enrollees, the exchange can level the 
playing field for consumers.
States thus have an important opportu-
nity to improve their health care market-
places through the creation of an exchange. 
And the health reform law gives the states 
substantial leeway to define critical aspects 
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of the exchange, including who is eligible to 
buy coverage through it, how aggressively 
it will set standards and negotiate with in-
surers, and who will run it. The details of 
these decisions matter, and will determine 
whether the exchange fully lives up to its 
promise. A weak exchange could wind up 
taking its cues from the insurance indus-
try, not consumers, and do little to shift 
the fundamental problems in most states’ 
health care markets. A strong exchange, 
though, can be just the tool states need to 
revolutionize their health care systems and 
improve quality while lowering costs.
Under the health reform law, state ex-
changes will be open for business starting 
in 2014. Before then, states will need to 
create their own exchanges—and if a state 
is not on track to do so by 2013, the federal 
Department of Health and Human Services 
will step in to operate one for the state. 
As of this writing, several states have 
already taken this opportunity and estab-
lished their exchanges. But not all exchang-
es are created equal, and many states have 
yet to commit to establishing one. This 
report assesses the current state of play, 
examining the progress that the states have 
made, and for the states that have taken the 
step of setting up their exchange, evaluat-
ing them on the myriad policies and criteria 
that will determine whether their exchange 
is ultimately successful in improving health 
care for consumers.
The remainder of this Introduction elab-
orates on what the federal law requires the 
states to do when they set up an exchange. 
The immediately following section explains 
in detail the scoring criteria we used to grade 
the state exchanges. The third section pres-
ents a report card for each of the states that 
have so far taken action on their exchange. 
Finally, the report concludes with a short 
analysis of where the remaining states are 
in terms of creating their exchange.
The fact that a majority of states have 
yet to formally establish their exchanges 
should not obscure the progress that has 
been made—in almost all states, study 
committees and stakeholder processes 
are examining options, looking to the 
examples of other states, and preparing to 
act. And several pathbreaking states are 
showing the way for others, even as they 
grapple with the increasingly detailed ques-
tions of implementation.
We hope that policymakers and advo-
cates in the states where an exchange has 
been established will be able to use this 
report to identify the strengths and weak-
nesses of their state’s exchange; even in 
California and Massachusetts, which have 
made the most progress towards setting 
up their exchanges, much work remains 
to implement the fine details of the new 
marketplace. For states that have yet to 
take action, the scorecards included in this 
report provide examples of which states 
have adopted best practices in specific ar-
eas of exchange implementation, allowing 
them to pick and choose the approaches 
that will work best for their unique health 
insurance markets.
The findings in this report are only a 
snapshot. As of this writing, many states 
continue their deliberations, and more may 
still take action before the end of the year. 
In the future, we plan to revisit these issues 
in later editions of this scorecard as more 
state exchanges become established, and 
early-adopter states bring their exchanges 
closer to being operational.
Exchange Requirements 
States have a large amount of flexibility to 
adapt the exchange to their particular goals 
and the state’s market and policy environ-
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ment, but the federal law does provide some 
important guidelines and requirements, 
including:
Timeline: Federal reform gives states 
the responsibility to establish exchanges for 
individuals and small businesses by 2014. 
If states do not establish an exchange by 
2014, the federal government will establish 
one for them.3 
Funding: States can apply for fed-
eral grants to help set up exchanges. 
By 2015, however, exchanges must be 
self-sustaining.4 
Eligibility: Individuals without group 
coverage will be able to use the exchange, as 
will small businesses of up to 100 employ-
ees, once the law’s full provisions go into 
effect in 2014. States that currently define 
a small business as one with 50 or fewer 
employees may first open the exchange to 
these smaller businesses and then expand to 
businesses with up to 100 workers by 2016. 
Further, states are explicitly authorized to 
open the exchanges to larger employers 
starting in 2017. The state may run separate 
exchanges for individuals and businesses, 
or combine them.5
How	 consumers	 connect	 to	 the	
exchange: The federal government will 
make a template internet portal available 
to states.6 States are required to create a 
website to help consumers compare plans, 
and operate a toll-free hotline to answer 
questions.7 
Helping	 consumers	 compare	 plans	
and	sign	up: The law directs the federal 
government to develop ranking systems on 
cost and quality, as well as an enrollee satis-
faction survey tool, for states to use to help 
consumers compare plans in the exchange.8 
It also requires states to use a standardized 
format to present health plan options, help 
applicants eligible for Medicaid or another 
public program enroll into that program, 
and offer an electronic calculator to al-
low consumers to evaluate their expected 
premiums after any tax credits or other 
benefits are factored in.9
Benefit	package: The federal govern-
ment will establish an essential health 
benefits package and four tiers of coverage, 
including bronze (the lowest level), silver, 
gold, and platinum (the highest), with a 
fifth “catastrophic” plan only available to 
people under 30 or who are exempt from 
the requirement to have coverage.10 States 
can require additional benefits, but must 
assume the cost for any subsidies for the 
additional benefits.11 
Subsidies: Consumers that make too 
much to qualify for Medicaid but cannot 
afford coverage are eligible for sliding scale 
assistance to pay for premiums, and limits 
on out-of-pocket costs. These subsidies 
are only available on, and will be delivered 
through, the exchange.12 
Criteria	for	health	plans: The law di-
rects the federal government to set criteria 
for an insurance plan to be a “qualified 
health plan” and allowed into the exchange. 
Criteria will include having sufficient 
choice of providers and implementing a 
quality improvement program. The law 
delegates the enforcement of the certifica-
tion of qualified health plans to the state 
exchange.13 Aside from some narrow excep-
tions, states may develop and enforce ad-
ditional criteria for qualified health plans, 
to better serve the interests of enrollees. 
For example, the state can empower the 
exchange to set additional quality stan-
dards, negotiate on costs, and engage in 
selective contracting. The exchange may 
also exclude plans with premium increases 
that are unjustified.14 
Reinsurance	and	Risk	Adjustment:	
The law directs states to establish a 
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reinsurance mechanism by 2014, to 
protect insurers in the individual and small 
group markets from having to raise rates 
because too many of their enrollees are 
sicker than average. For similar reasons, 
it also provides for risk corridor and risk 
adjustment programs.15
Process: The law requires state ex-
changes to consult with a range of interests 
in setting up their exchanges, and requires 
the exchange to be transparent regarding 
its costs.16 
Outside of these fairly limited provi-
sions, states can make their own decisions 
about what their exchange should look like 
and who should run it.
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This section explains the scores used to grade each state’s exchange. Our scorecard breaks exchanges down into 
four major areas, issuing subtotal grades 
for each: first, the governance and overall 
structure of the exchange; second, the abil-
ity of the exchange to negotiate on behalf of 
consumers and drive lower rates and higher 
quality; third, the overall experience and 
ease of use the consumer will experience 
when searching for and buying coverage 
on the exchange; and fourth, the stability 
of the exchange and its protections against 
the risk of adverse selection.
The policies and issues we use to grade 
the state exchanges are in large measure 
drawn from the best practices identified in 
our previous report, Building a Better Health 
Care Marketplace. For more detail on these 
policies, please consult that report.17
This scorecard does not set out a one-
size-fits-all model for an exchange. Dif-
ferent states have very different health 
care marketplaces and population health 
needs, and will justifiably take different 
approaches in creating their exchange. 
The criteria that follow primarily look 
to a few basic, building-block protections 
that will benefit consumers in all states, 
and at whether the exchange is given the 
flexibility and power it needs to meet en-
rollees’ needs. Two exchanges that both 
have the power to set standards for plans 
to participate, or to recommend legislation 
to protect against adverse selection, may 
well make very different decisions about 
how best to exercise those powers—but 
regardless of the content of those decisions, 
they will both provide a better marketplace 
for consumers than an exchange that lacks 
those powers entirely.
As of this writing, the federal Depart-
ment of Health and Human Services is 
soliciting comments on draft regulations 
governing state exchanges. Many of those 
regulations pertain to the issues discussed 
below. However, since the regulations have 
yet to be finalized, we do not include their 
requirements in our grading.
II. Explaining the Scorecards
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Governance and Overall 
Structure 
The basic structure and governance of 
the exchange are absolutely critical to 
making the new marketplace a success. 
The exchange must be transparent and 
accountable to the individual and small 
business consumers who will buy their 
coverage through it. If it is dominated 
by industry interests or opaque in its 
operations, it will not win consumers’ 
trust and will have a hard time attracting 
enrollees. And because the broader the 
exchange’s eligibility rules are, the more 
consumers will be able to benefit, it is im-
portant to cast as wide a net as possible. 
This series of criteria are worth 25 
points in total.
Exchange	Structure: states have three 
primary options for how to set up their 
exchange: as an independent public agency 
with its own governing board; as an ordi-
nary part of its administrative agencies; or 
as a private not-for-profit corporation. 
Accountability can best be insured by 
creating the exchange as a strong, inde-
pendent public agency, with a governing 
board. Having the exchange be a private 
non-profit runs the danger of making it 
unaccountable to the public. At the same 
time, the exchange will need to have some 
degree of independence from the state’s 
government; otherwise it will not have the 
agility and power it will need to be an effec-
tive advocate for consumers, and consum-
ers and insurers might fear that practical 
business decisions would be influenced by 
political considerations. 
Table	2.	Model	Scorecard
Governance	and	Overall	Structure	 Negotiating	Power	and	Driving	Value	
Exchange	Structure	 5	points	 Active	Purchaser	 10	points
Board	Makeup	 8	points	 Delivery/Payment		 10	points
Conflicts	of	Interest	 5	points	 Reforms	
Transparency	 2	points	 Rate	Review	 5	points
Size	of	Exchange	 3	points	 Standardization		 5	points
Stakeholder	Input	 2	points	 of	Products	
TOTAL	 25	points	 TOTAL	 30	points
Consumer	Experience	 	 Stability
Navigators	 5	points	 Ongoing	Monitoring	 3	points
Rating	Tools	 5	points	 Prohibitions	on		 5	points
Eligibility	and		 5	points		 Steering	
Enrollment	Systems	 	 Restrictions	on	 5	points	
Privacy	Protections	 5	points	 Off-Exchange	Plans
Language	Access	 5	points	 Financing	 2	points
TOTAL	 25	points	 TOTAL	 15	points
TOTAL	SCORE:	95	points
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This criterion is worth up to five points; 
we assign the full five if the exchange is an 
independent public agency with its own 
board, two if it is an ordinary part of a 
state administrative agency, and zero if it 
is a private nonprofit.
Board	makeup: the board of the ex-
change will be charged with making many 
decisions that will have profound implica-
tions for the state’s health care and insur-
ance markets. For it to serve the interest of 
enrollees when it confronts these decisions, 
consumers should play the leading role, and 
it must be free of industry influence. 
Consumers need the exchange to deliver 
high quality, affordable coverage—when 
it comes to negotiating for a better deal, 
their interests are at odds with those of 
the insurers. Because brokers are usually 
paid by insurers on commission for the 
policies they sell, they face a similar con-
flict of interest. So do providers, because 
pressure on insurers to lower costs might 
translate to cost pressure on providers. As 
a result, representatives of these industry 
interests should not serve on the exchange 
board (though exceptions could be made for 
health care providers who do not have an 
ownership interest in a health care facility 
or hospital or who do not currently prac-
tice, as the impact of exchange decisions 
on their financial affairs would be very 
limited). Representatives of associations of 
such industries, or of businesses a major-
ity of whose clients are in such industries, 
likewise should be excluded from service.
This criterion is worth up to eight 
points. We assign the full credit if all indus-
try representatives are barred from serv-
ing on the board, and there is a majority 
of consumer representatives; seven points 
if all industry representatives are barred 
but there is no guarantee of a consumer 
majority (due to the presence, for example, 
of state government officials serving ex 
officio). Where some, but not all industry 
representatives are barred but there is a 
consumer majority, we assign five points. 
If a state does not specifically bar industry 
representatives but prevents anyone with a 
financial conflict of interest from serving 
on the board, or if some industry represen-
tatives are allowed but they are specifically 
prohibited from constituting a majority, we 
assign four points. 
If some but not all industry representa-
tives are barred, but there is no requirement 
of a consumer majority and nothing to stop 
industry from receiving a majority of the 
board, we assign two points. If no industry 
interests at all are barred, and they may be 
able to establish a voting majority, we assign 
one point; if the exchange board is stipulated 
to consist of a majority of industry represen-
tatives, we award zero points.
Finally, where a state has chosen to set 
up its exchange as part of a state agency, 
this criterion is inapplicable and we do not 
include it in calculating the state’s score.
Conflict	of	interest	protections: keep-
ing industry representatives from serving 
on the exchange board is an important step, 
but by itself will not guarantee that the 
board’s decision-making is free of conflicts 
of interest. Board members might face a 
conflict when particular decisions implicate 
specific financial or personal interests. In 
such cases, the conflict of interest should 
be disclosed, and board members should 
recuse themselves from both discussion of 
and voting on the issue.
This criterion is worth five pints; states 
receive full credit if board members with 
a conflict must recuse themselves from 
both discussion and voting; three points if 
they must be recused from voting but may 
otherwise participate in discussion about 
the decision; and zero points if there are 
no conflict of interest protections.
12 Making the Grade
As above, where a state has chosen to set 
up its exchange as part of a state agency we 
do not consider this criterion.
Transparency: the public needs to know 
that the exchange is working efficiently to 
promote their interests. The state will also 
need to know the details of its operations, 
to inform their oversight and deliberations 
about possible further reforms. As result, 
transparency and public reporting are criti-
cal to allowing the exchange to build the 
trust it needs to do its job. 
That means the exchange’s yearly 
budget and details of its spending and 
revenue, including any contract agree-
ments it reaches with insurers or outside 
vendors, should be made available to the 
public. Transcripts of hearings and other 
public proceedings should also be public 
and easily accessible. 
However, some records and informa-
tion, in particular those involving specific 
negotiations with health insurers, will need 
to remain confidential in order to protect 
the exchange’s ability to drive a good bar-
gain on behalf of consumers. Such materi-
als should ordinarily not be open to public 
disclosure.
This criterion is worth two points. A 
state receives full credit if the state’s open 
meetings and public records laws apply to 
all exchange activities except the sensitive 
contract-related issues discussed above, and 
if the exchange’s budget and final contracts 
are open to public inspection. We assign 
one point if less comprehensive or less spe-
cific transparency measures apply, and zero 
points if there are no specific guarantees of 
transparency.
Size	of	the	exchange: the exchange will 
be most effective if it is open to as many 
consumers as possible. Greater enrollment 
means greater negotiating power, greater 
stability, and greater economies of scale, as 
well as providing the exchange’s benefits to 
even more of a state’s residents. 
Under the federal law, states must open 
their exchanges to individuals and small 
businesses with up to fifty employees start-
ing in 2014, and to small businesses with 
up to 100 employees in 2016. They have 
the option of including all businesses up 
to 100 employees immediately in 2014, and 
likewise of opening the exchange to large 
businesses with more than 100 employees 
in 2017. 
This criterion is worth three points. 
The full three points are awarded if small 
businesses up to 100 employees are eligible 
in 2014, and large businesses are allowed 
into the exchange in 2017; two points are 
awarded if small businesses up to 100 em-
ployees are on the exchange in 2014 but no 
action is taken on large businesses. A single 
point is given where large businesses are 
allowed in starting in 2017, but businesses 
between 51 and 100 employees only get 
exchange access in 2016. Zero points are 
assigned if the state only abides by the 
federal minimums. 
Stakeholder	input: the exchange’s deci-
sions will be better if they’re informed by 
representatives of important stakeholder 
groups, including an array of consumer 
representatives who can best communicate 
the unique needs of particular constituen-
cies. Of course, industry participation in 
such stakeholder processes is also impor-
tant.
This criterion is worth two points, 
which are given if the exchange is specifi-
cally instructed to consult with stakehold-
ers including consumer representatives. 
If there is no such instruction (including 
if there is a stakeholder process in which 
consumers are not specifically named), zero 
points are assigned. 
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Negotiating Power and  
Driving Value  
If the exchange is simply a website that 
offers the same plans that are currently 
available on the market, it will have 
missed much of its potential. A well-
made state exchange can help deliver 
lower costs for individuals and small 
businesses. Just as big businesses negoti-
ate with insurers, using the bargaining 
power of their employees to push for 
lower premiums, so too can exchange en-
rollees benefit from a muscular exchange 
that negotiates on their behalf for better 
choices and lower costs.
The exchange will need to do more than 
simply take all insurers who want to sell 
their products to its enrollees. It will have 
to take a close look at the benefits being 
offered, and the premiums and cost-shar-
ing being charged, to assess whether they 
provide a good value. And in addition to ne-
gotiating on cost, it should also push insur-
ers to adopt groundbreaking payment and 
delivery reforms, like bundled payments 
and reimbursement for better primary care 
through medical homes, which can lower 
costs while improving quality.  
Another way the exchange can facilitate 
lower costs and higher value is by standard-
izing insurers’ products so consumers have 
apples to apples choices of plans, which 
will foster competition on price and qual-
ity rather than confusing fine print. And 
because insurers’ premium increases will 
be reviewed to determine whether they’re 
unreasonable, the exchange should also 
engage with that process to make sure 
enrollees are receiving a fair deal.
This set of criteria are collectively worth 
thirty points.
Active	purchaser	authority: empower-
ing the exchange to negotiate will provide 
consumers and small businesses with an 
exchange that is not only a transparent and 
fair marketplace, but also a much-needed 
advocate standing up for their interests. A 
negotiating exchange will deliver concrete 
value for enrollees, with the potential to 
save consumers millions of dollars.
There are two primary ways the ex-
change can leverage the bargaining power 
of its enrollees: first, by engaging in indi-
vidual negotiation, or “selective contract-
ing,” with insurers, deciding on a case by 
case basis whether a particular product will 
deliver a high value option for enrollees, 
and second, by setting overall plan criteria 
in addition to the federal minimums. Ide-
ally, exchanges will be empowered to use 
both tools.
This criterion is worth up to ten points. 
A full score is awarded where the exchange 
has the power to set certification standards 
above the federal minimums, with an 
explicit direction to include cost or value 
as one of the criteria, and is also directed 
to negotiate individually with insurers 
and/or engage in selective contracting. 
Eight points are given where the exchange 
can set standards but cost or value are not 
specifically listed, and the exchange has 
selective contracting or individual negotia-
tion authority. 
Five points are given if the exchange 
can only set standards for certification, 
but cannot engage in individual negotia-
tion or selective contracting. If the state 
does not explicitly address the question of 
the exchange’s ability to act as an active 
purchaser, we award two points. And if the 
state specifically requires the exchange to 
take all comers or bars it from saying no 
to a plan, we assign zero points.
Delivery	 and	payment	 reforms: too 
much of our current health care spending 
does not yield improved health.  Instead, as 
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much as a third of all health care spending 
goes to treatments that at best are inef-
fective, and at worst can pose a danger to 
patient health.18 The widely used fee-for-
service payment approach, which rewards 
providers for the number and complexity 
of tests and procedures that can be billed, 
not the quality of care provided or whether 
the patient gets healthy, is one root of this 
problem.
Fortunately, research and the experience 
of innovative providers across the country 
have charted a path toward medical care 
which can better rein in costs and improve 
patient’s health. Primary care physicians 
need to be able to work as a part of a team 
coordinating with a patients’ other health 
professionals so that patients get all the 
care they need while avoiding unneces-
sary, duplicative, or harmful tests and 
procedures.19 
The exchange, in its negotiations with 
insurers, can drive them to adopt these 
proven strategies, which will improve en-
rollees’ health and lower overall health care 
costs. It should have a variety of mecha-
nisms at its disposal in accomplishing these 
goals. If the exchange requires plans to 
submit competitive bids to participate, the 
extent and quality of cost-saving reforms 
should be a required element of every 
insurer’s bid. Insurers participating in the 
exchange could be required to pay provid-
ers via bundled payments where appropri-
ate, or reimburse primary care doctors for 
leading a medical home team. 
The impact of the exchange’s efforts in 
this area will be magnified if it coordinates 
with other payers in the state, including 
state employee benefit plans and large 
employers.
This criterion is worth ten points. The 
full value is assigned if the state directs the 
exchange to require plans to adopt a robust 
suite of delivery and payment reforms, in-
cluding medical homes and better primary 
care, and also to align its payment policies 
with those of other large payers. Eight 
points are given if there is no instruction 
to align incentives with other payers, but 
the exchange can require insurers to adopt 
reforms. 
Five points are given if the exchange 
can encourage reforms, but is not specifi-
cally allowed to require these reforms of 
participating plans. If the state gives the 
exchange the ability to label certain plans as 
high-performing on these reforms, so that 
consumers can take this into account when 
choosing coverage, we assign three points. 
If no mention is made of these reforms, we 
assign zero points.
This criterion is interactive with the 
previous one; if an exchange must take 
all comers, its ability to drive change in 
the marketplace will also necessarily be 
limited.
Incorporation	 of	 rate	 review: the 
exchange can play a role in protecting 
consumers from unreasonable rate in-
creases. In many states, regulators review 
insurers’ proposed rate increases to ensure 
that they are justified, and the new law 
sets up a similar procedure at the federal 
level for states that do not currently review 
rates. In determining whether a premium 
increase is justified, regulators weigh some 
considerations that are similar to those the 
exchange should use in its negotiations, 
including whether the benefits offered 
are reasonable given the premium being 
charged. However, rate review also looks 
to broader issues, including the impact of 
the rate increase on insurers’ solvency and 
ability to pay future claims. 
Because the exchange, unlike a regula-
tor, is concerned first and foremost with 
the interests of consumers, rate review is no 
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substitute for an exchange with the power 
to negotiate. But states should take steps 
to harmonize the exchange’s negotiations 
with their regulatory rate review processes, 
increasing the exchange’s effectiveness 
and efficiency. In particular, the exchange 
should be directed to decertify plans with 
a history of unreasonable rate increases, 
and should participate in the rate review 
process by submitting comments to the 
appropriate authority, to ensure that the 
review takes account of the exchange’s 
perspective and priorities.
This criterion is worth five points in 
total. All five are given where the state 
exchange is directed to refuse plans with a 
history of unreasonable rate increases (in 
states where regulators have prior approval 
over both the individual and small group 
markets, we assume that this criterion is 
met), and the exchange is instructed to sub-
mit comments or otherwise engage in the 
rate review process; we assign three points 
where one or the other of these criteria are 
met; and where neither is included, we as-
sign zero points.
Standardization	 of	 products: one 
important way the exchange can help im-
prove cost and quality is by empowering 
consumers to make more informed deci-
sions about their coverage. In particular, by 
standardizing the products insurers offer, 
it can help foster healthy competition: if 
insurers’ ability to come up with dozens 
of products with slight benefit variations is 
limited, consumers will have an easier time 
comparison shopping on cost and quality. 
The experience of Massachusetts’s state 
exchange, the Connector, has been that 
consumers prefer to have fewer, more 
significantly different options, rather than 
a vast array of slightly-varied products 
whose differences are not immediately 
clear.20 Exchanges can respond to this 
desire and further drive competition by 
standardizing products to weed out un-
necessary variation and allow for better 
comparison-shopping.
States may earn up to five points under 
this criterion. Five are awarded if insurance 
products both on and off the exchange 
are standardized; three are given where 
exchange products only are standardized; 
one point is given if some, but not all, plans 
either on or off the exchange are standard-
ized; zero points are assigned if there is no 
power to standardize plan offerings. 
The Consumer Experience
Perhaps the ultimate test of the exchange’s 
effectiveness will be whether it becomes an 
attractive, consumer-friendly marketplace. 
For all the attention that must be paid to 
getting the behind-the-scenes aspects of 
the exchange to work, the front end is just 
as important. When a consumer goes to 
the exchange to buy coverage, it should be 
a simple, easy process, unencumbered by 
needless red tape. 
There should be comparison tools that 
make the task of picking a plan intuitive 
and clear, and informed exchange employ-
ees who can help guide consumers through 
the process. Consumers’ personal informa-
tion should be protected, the linguistic 
and cultural diversity of the state should 
be taken into account, and if someone who 
is eligible for a public program like Med-
icaid applies to the exchange, they should 
be seamlessly enrolled in that program 
without having to jump through additional 
bureaucratic hoops.
Even if the state ensures that its ex-
change is fair and effective, if it is not 
easy to use and trusted by consumers, 
eligible enrollees won’t materialize. And 
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if consumers lack the ability to understand 
their options and make informed decisions, 
the power of the exchange to drive compe-
tition and quality will be undermined. 
In total, states may earn up to 25 points 
under the criteria in this area.
Navigators: the federal law requires 
state exchanges to run a Navigator pro-
gram, through which the exchange will 
contract with individuals and organizations 
to provide information and help eligible 
consumers enroll in the exchange. 
Insurance brokers and agents may be a 
natural choice to help with some aspects 
of the Navigator program, but while many 
brokers possess significant expertise about 
private coverage, and have deep relation-
ships with some small businesses, in many 
states they may not have the required 
knowledge about public programs, or the 
language or cultural skills needed to per-
form effective outreach to underserved 
communities.
As a result, in designing their outreach 
efforts, states should make sure that they 
have all their bases covered—in some 
communities, brokers can be an effective 
information source, but a strong Navigator 
program should also include a wider array 
of organizations, particularly those with 
longstanding ties to underserved commu-
nities and constituencies.
There are five points available under 
this criterion. All five are awarded where 
the exchange is directed to partner with 
community and/or consumer groups as 
part of its Navigator program, and there’s 
no restriction requiring Navigators to 
be licensed as brokers; three are given if 
there is no requirement that Navigators be 
brokers, but there is no direction given on 
community or consumer group participa-
tion; and no points are given where the 
state requires all Navigators to be licensed 
as insurance brokers or agents. 
Rating	and	ranking	tools: consumers 
must be able to understand their options 
and easily determine what coverage is right 
for them, in order to maximize the benefits 
of the exchange as a competitive health care 
marketplace. To get past this confusing 
status quo and provide a consumer-friendly 
shopping experience, the exchange must do 
several things. 
First, it must help consumers make 
apples to apples comparisons of plans, mak-
ing it easy for a consumer to compare the 
important aspects of two different coverage 
options at a glance, so they can focus in on 
important differences as they narrow down 
the list of options. This should also include 
ratings that allow for a clear understanding 
of when one plan is better than another, 
rather than simply just different. 
It must also make it easy to find products 
that meet a consumer’s needs. The con-
sumer should be able to prioritize different 
criteria, such as whether they care more 
about price, specific categories of benefits, 
location and breadth of provider networks, 
customer service, quality of care, history of 
premium increases, and so on—and then 
run a customized search to find plans that 
meet those particular needs. 
We give up to five points under this cri-
terion. Full credit is awarded if the exchange 
is instructed to provide consumer tools al-
lowing for consumers to make easy, apples-
to-apples comparisons on cost, benefits, and 
provider networks, and both rankings and 
ratings are incorporated into these tools. 
Two points are given if the exchange is em-
powered to develop such tools but without 
the specificity of incorporating rankings 
or easy comparisons on each of the above 
areas. Zero points are assigned if there are 
no specific directions on this point.
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Eligibility	and	enrollment: under the 
federal law, exchanges must use a single, 
streamlined application for coverage, 
helping to make enrollment and eligibility 
determinations much simpler and less ad-
ministratively complex. However, there is 
a major potential challenge the exchange’s 
eligibility and enrollment systems must 
confront: some of those who try to buy 
coverage through the exchange will inevi-
tably be eligible for a public program, such 
as Medicaid or CHIP. 
In order to meet this challenge in an 
efficient, cost-effective way, the exchange 
must make it simple for consumers to enroll 
in the program that is appropriate for them. 
This means it must coordinate its eligibil-
ity systems with those of the state’s public 
programs, to catch whether an applicant is 
eligible for one of them instead. If so, the 
exchange should forward the application to 
the relevant agency, which can then process 
the paperwork and enroll the applicant, 
without requiring the applicant to submit 
duplicate forms or visit another office.
Creating this streamlined no-wrong-
door enrollment system will be important 
to ensuring that consumers are able to eas-
ily sign up for coverage. Not only will this 
benefit those consumers, it will also be im-
portant for ensuring that the exchange has 
a stable risk pool—the larger the number 
of enrollees, the more stable the exchange 
will be, and the applicants most likely to be 
turned off by a complex application process 
will be those who are healthy and least in 
need of coverage. 
This criterion is worth up to f ive 
points. Five are assigned if the exchange is 
instructed to create a no-wrong-door en-
rollment system that automatically enrolls 
applicants into whatever coverage program 
they are eligible for; two points are given 
if the exchange is required to coordinate 
with the agencies responsible for other 
public programs, but could still require 
consumers to manually resubmit or revise 
their applications; and zero points are as-
signed if there are no instructions above 
the federal minimum.
Privacy	 protections: if consumers 
are not confident that the exchange will 
keep their personal data safe, they will be 
hesitant to enter the exchange or give it the 
personal and financial information needed 
to make accurate eligibility and enrollment 
decisions. Thus, the exchange must develop 
and implement a plan to ensure that iden-
tifiable personal information is not shared, 
internally or externally, with those who do 
not have an immediate, legitimate need for 
it, for example in order to make eligibility 
determinations or process payments. 
In particular, it should be barred from 
selling any personal data, even in the ag-
gregate or de-identified, or share it with 
others for commercial use. Protections 
must be adopted to prevent data breaches 
or unauthorized access, and in the event 
that such breaches do occur, the exchange 
must speedily inform consumers and take 
strong action to minimize the harm. 
We award up to five points for this area, 
with full credit going to states that specifi-
cally prohibit the sale or commercial use of 
any personal data, and specifically require 
consumers to be notified in the event of a 
data breach. Three points are awarded if 
one but not both of these protections are in 
place; zero points are assigned otherwise. 
Language	access: in performing out-
reach and helping consumers to enroll in 
coverage, the state must take account of 
the diverse language and cultural needs 
of potential enrollees and lay out a plan 
to meet them—simply offering a Spanish 
version of the web portal, for example, is a 
good start but in most states will likely not 
be enough to guarantee that all consumers 
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are able to use the exchange effectively. A 
good rule of thumb is that all written mate-
rials should be translated into any language 
spoken by at least 5% of potential enrollees, 
assessed on a per-county or per-city level, 
and provision should be made for enrollees 
speaking other languages that fall below 
this threshold.
States can earn up to five points for these 
issues. All five are given if the exchange’s 
written materials must all be translated 
into languages spoken by at least 5% of 
the eligible population, on a per-county 
and/or per-city basis, and specific provision 
is made for translators for other languages 
that fall below this threshold; we give two 
points if the exchange is simply instructed 
to address linguistic and cultural compe-
tency issues in developing its materials and 
outreach; zero points otherwise.
Stability and Protection  
From Adverse Selection
In the past, many states have experimented 
with creating purchasing pools like ex-
changes, and their experience has shown 
that safeguarding the stability of the 
exchange must be a high priority. Many 
such pools have been failures, forced to 
close their doors by upwardly-spiraling 
premiums and downwardly-spiraling 
enrollment.21 These failures can often be 
traced to a single dynamic: sicker enrollees 
congregated within the purchasing pools, 
with healthier enrollees remaining out-
side. Because sicker enrollees cost more to 
insure, this drives up premiums, leading 
more healthy people to drop coverage 
and secure less expensive coverage on 
their own, which in turn sends premiums 
within the pool up again. This phenom-
enon, called adverse selection, can lead 
to a vicious cycle that only ends with the 
destruction of the purchasing pool.
States must ensure that the exchange 
does not become a dumping-ground for 
less-healthy patients, with healthier enroll-
ees purchasing coverage outside of it.  This 
is critical both to protect consumers and 
to instill confidence in insurers—if they 
are worried that adverse selection might 
undermine the exchange, they will be sig-
nificantly less likely to participate.
Fortunately, the federal law guards 
against the worst risks of adverse selection 
by preventing insurers both on and off the 
exchange from directly discriminating 
against the sick, and it also contains spe-
cific provisions aimed at balancing risk on 
and off the exchange. But to complement 
these policies, states must adopt additional 
measures to ensure that adverse selection 
does not undermine the viability of their 
insurance market.
Fifteen points in total are assigned for 
these issues.
Ongoing	monitoring: one of the sim-
plest, yet most important, things a state 
can do to prevent adverse selection is to 
monitor the stability of its exchange. If 
the exchange, or a state regulatory body, 
is instructed to closely measure the risk 
profile of enrollees on and off the exchange, 
it can take quick action to prevent or miti-
gate problems as they arise. In many cases, 
this may require further state legislation to 
stabilize the market outside the exchange, 
so the entity monitoring for stability should 
have the power to recommend legislative 
action if needed.
Three points are assigned for this crite-
rion: all three are given if the state sets up 
an authority to watchdog adverse selection, 
and empowers the watchdog to recommend 
legislative action or otherwise take needed 
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action to correct problems; one point is 
given if the state requires monitoring of the 
exchange’s stability but does not provide 
specific powers to correct any imbalances; 
we assign zero points if the risk of adverse 
selection is not addressed.
Prohibition	 on	 steering: one way 
that less-healthy people can wind up in 
the exchange is if insurers or brokers put 
them there. Because many insurers might 
wish to keep their non-exchange risk-pool 
as healthy as possible, they may have an 
incentive to direct less-healthy applicants 
into the exchange.
To guard against this possibility, states 
should protect the exchange by prohibiting 
insurers or brokers from steering people 
either onto or off of the exchange, through 
setting different broker commissions, 
adopting targeted marketing strategies, 
or by any other method. This prohibition 
should be policed via the state insurance 
regulator, as well as the licensing authority 
for brokers.
Five points may be given for this crite-
rion. Full credit is assigned if both brokers 
and insurers are prevented from steering 
enrollees either on or off the exchange, 
including requirements that all products 
be fairly and affirmatively marketed to all 
potential enrollees. Three points are given 
if there are general steering prohibitions 
that do not go into specific detail, or that 
prohibit steering only for exchange-par-
ticipating plans. Otherwise, we assign 
zero points.
Restrictions	on	plans	offered	outside	
exchange: If certain kinds of products are 
primarily available either on the exchange 
or off of it, consumers who want those 
kinds of products will be drawn to that 
marketplace. That means that if products 
that appeal most to healthy consumers are 
primarily available outside the exchange, 
or if products that sicker consumers will 
want to buy are primarily available on the 
exchange, this could create a risk of adverse 
selection.
A state can reduce this risk by requiring 
insurers to offer “mirror” versions of all 
their products, such that they sell identi-
cal exchange and non-exchange products. 
If that approach is not possible, states 
could ensure that at least some products 
are available both inside and outside the 
exchange. The federal law already requires 
that exchange-participating insurers offer 
both at least one silver and one gold product 
inside of the exchange, so one place to start 
would be requiring insurers to offer those 
products outside the exchange as well as on 
the exchange, or go even further.
High-deductible catastrophic plans, 
which can be offered only to young adults 
and those who have no other affordable 
coverage options, pose the greatest adverse 
selection risk, since they will be most at-
tractive to the healthiest enrollees. States 
can mitigate this risk by requiring such 
plans to be offered only on the exchange, or 
requiring insurers who offer such products 
off the exchange to also sell an identical 
version on the exchange. 
States may earn up to five points on 
this criterion. All five are given if insurers 
must offer an identical array of products 
both on and off the exchange; four are 
assigned if insurers must offer high-
benefit plans (including at least one gold 
plan) off of the exchange (or must offer 
all exchange plans in the outside mar-
ket), and the sale of catastrophic plans is 
limited outside the exchange in the ways 
described above. If the state only includes 
one of the previous two protections, we 
give it two points; if no attempt is made 
to reduce adverse selection by limiting 
plans available off the exchange, we give 
out zero points.
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Financing: the primary way most ex-
changes will be funded is through a fee 
assessed on insurers. But whether the fee 
is assessed on all insurance plans, or just 
those sold through the exchange, will have 
important implications for the exchange’s 
stability. 
Assessing a fee solely on exchange plans 
should be avoided, regardless of whether 
the assessment is paid primarily by the 
insurer, or passed on to the consumer. 
In the former case, insurers will have a 
positive incentive to steer enrollees into 
non-exchange plans to avoid the assess-
ment; in the latter, consumers would face 
slightly higher prices on the exchange, 
and would be more likely to go to the 
outside market. In both cases, the effect 
is likely to be strongest for the healthiest 
enrollees, who will be most sensitive to 
small differences in premium, and who 
would therefore be more likely to avoid 
the exchange, threatening its stability. 
Assessing the fee on all insurers would 
eliminate this danger. 
The assessment should be shared by 
everyone in the market because the ex-
change benefits all the market players. 
The outreach and engagement generated 
by the exchange will increase participation 
inside and outside the exchange, increasing 
the number of customers. The exchange 
website will allow for plan comparisons 
that people getting coverage outside the ex-
change might use as well (just as many con-
sumers may browse for products through 
online shopping portals, then go out and 
buy them at a brick and mortar store). The 
exchange will also likely administer risk 
adjustment programs that will help keep 
risk pools stable across the entire state.  
This final criterion is worth up to two 
points. Both are given if the exchange’s fee 
is placed on all plans, not just those sold 
on the exchange; one point is given if the 
exchange is not prohibited from assessing 
a broad fee on all insurance plans; and we 
assign zero points if the fee is specifically 
required to be placed only on exchange-
participating plans. 
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Twelve states have defined their ex-changes sufficiently for us to analyze them using the scorecard laid out in 
the previous section.  
Our analysis looks only to provisions 
specifically included in state exchange legis-
lation or executive orders, or closely-related 
legislation passed at the same time. In future 
editions of this report, we will also include 
regulations and operating rules of estab-
lished exchanges as they come online. 
Where there is ambiguity about whether 
a state law of general applicability pertains 
to the exchange—for example, where a 
state has a general rule about conflicts of 
interest, but does not specifically cite them 
in creating its exchange board—we will 
not count them as applying, to encourage 
states to explicitly address the key policy 
questions we identify, so that consumers 
and businesses will know exactly what the 
rules of the road are.
As discussed in more detail in the 
specific scorecards, some states have 
decided to take a piecemeal approach to 
their exchanges, in some cases defining 
only the governance and overall structure 
of their exchange in initial legislation 
or executive action. And in some cases, 
they have explicitly reserved judgment on 
important policy questions, such as the 
eventual size of the exchange and whether 
it will act as an active purchaser, asking 
the exchange board or some other entity 
to develop recommendations or options for 
later state action.
Where action on an issue is specifically 
reserved, we exclude that criterion from 
the final grade a state receives, as it is clear 
that the state is aware of the issue but has 
not yet made a final determination (in 
such cases we use the mark “N/S”, for “not 
scored”). Similarly, where a state clearly 
is deferring action on entire categories 
of exchange operations, we do not assign 
grades for those categories. If, however, 
the state’s action simply does not address 
a particular question, we do include that 
criterion in the final grade, because that 
suggests the exchange may have to meet 
the issue without a specific grant of power 
or guidance.
Some of the criteria we use to rate 
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exchanges are fairly specific, and to make 
sure that consumers actually benefit 
from promised protections, in several 
cases we assign fewer points to a vague 
declaration of an exchange’s goal than to 
specific, operational commitments. Where 
ambiguous legislative language leaves it 
less than clear that a particular policy will 
apply, we err against assigning additional 
points, if nothing else because consumers 
and enrollees should have perfect clarity 
on what the exchange will do. This is not 
to undermine the importance of legislative 
intent, or to suggest that the exchange 
would later be prohibited from taking 
action to win full points. For example, if 
a statute instructs the exchange to assist 
applicants in enrolling in public programs 
such as Medicaid, but does not explicitly 
require that they be automatically enrolled 
rather than being referred to some other 
agency, we award only partial credit even 
though the legislative intent might be 
to adopt a no-wrong-door model and 
the exchange might later create such a 
system.
Finally, in interpreting our rankings, it 
is important to keep in mind that even in 
State	 Governance	 Negotiating	 Consumer	 Stability	 Total		 Percentage	 Final	
	 and	 Power	and	 Experience	 	 Score	 of	Available	 Grade
	 Structure	 Driving	Value	 	 	 	 Points
California	 21	of	25	 13	of	30	 12	of	25	 8	of	15	 54	of	95	 57%	 B+
Colorado	 9	of	22	 3	of	15	 N/S	 N/S	 12	of	37	 32%	 C	*
Connecticut	 21	of	22	 13	of	30	 12	of	25	 5	of	15	 51	of	92	 55%	 B+
Hawaii	 5	of	22	 3	of	15	 7	of	10	 1	of	2	 16	of	49	 41%	 C	
Maryland	 21	of	22	 3	of	5	 4	of	10	 1	of	2	 29	of	39	 74%	 A	*
Massachusetts	 13	of	25	 16	of	20	 15	of	20	 N/S	 44	of	65	 68%	 A-
Nevada	 8	of	25	 N/S	 N/S	 N/S	 8	of	25	 32%	 C	*
Oregon	 15	of	25	 14	of	30	 11	of	25	 2	of	15	 42	of	95	 44%	 B-
Rhode	Island	 14	of	25	 24	of	30	 5	of	25	 2	of	15	 45	of	95	 47%	 B	
Vermont	 5	of	9	 23	of	30	 12	of	25	 0	of	8	 40	of	72	 56%	 B+
Washington	 17	of	22	 3	of	5	 N/S	 N/S	 20	of	27	 74%	 A	*
West	Virginia	 11	of	25	 3	of	5	 N/S	 N/S	 14	of	30	 47%	 B	*
States	with	asterisks	next	to	their	grades	have	been	assessed	on	criteria	worth	half	or	less	of	all	available	scorecard	
points.	Typically,	this	is	because	their	legislation	sets	up	governance	and	structure	only,	and	contemplates	future	
state	action;	we	have	accordingly	not	rated	them	on	criteria	their	laws	do	not	address.	Thus,	their	grades	should	be	
considered	highly	provisional.
Table	4.	State	Exchange	Scorecard.
Table	3.	Scoring	Curve
	 Percent	of		
	 Available		
	 Points	Earned	 Grade
	 85-100	 A+
	 70-85	 A
	 60-70	 A-
	 50-60	 B+
	 45-50	 B	
	 40-45	 B-
	 35-40	 C+
	 30-35	 C	
	 20-30	 C-
	 10-25	 D
	 0-10	 F
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states like California and Massachusetts, 
who have had the most time to set up their 
exchanges, they remain a work in progress. 
In many states, further legislation or official 
state action may occur in the next year or 
two, and newly-established exchanges will 
further define their operations through 
regulations and operating rules. 
That means that as a result of our meth-
odological decisions, it is very unlikely that 
any initial piece of legislation or executive 
order establishing the exchange could have 
sufficient detail and comprehensiveness 
to ensure that any state achieves a perfect 
score. As a result, while we list the raw 
points scored by each state, we use a grad-
ing curve to assign letter grades, as shown 
in Chart Three. Because we expect states 
to make progress over time, future edi-
tions of this report will employ a different 
ranking scheme.
California
California was the first state to take action 
to create an exchange after the passage of 
federal health reform, with then-Governor 
Schwarzenegger signing SB 900 and AB 
1602 in September of 2010.22 In the year 
since, a full complement of members have 
been named to the exchange’s board, and it 
has held monthly meetings, engaging with 
stakeholders and applying for additional 
federal grants. 
As its scorecard indicates, California’s 
exchange is quite strong across the board, 
offering an appealing model for other 
states. The major area where the exchange 
could be improved is in its ability to drive 
payment and delivery reforms. While the 
exchange was constituted with strong ac-
tive purchaser authority, with a mandate to 
engage in selective contracting to promote 
Table	5.	California	Scorecard
Governance	and	Overall	Structure	 Negotiating	Power	and	Driving	Value	
Exchange	Structure	 5	of	5	 Active	Purchaser	 10	of	10		
Board	Makeup	 7	of	8	 Delivery/Payment	 0	of	10	
Conflicts	of	Interest	 5	of	5	 Reforms	
Transparency	 2	of	2	 Rate	Review	 0	of	5
Size	of	Exchange	 0	of	3	 Standardization		 3	of	5
Stakeholder	Input	 2	of	2	 of	Products	
TOTAL	 21	of	25	 TOTAL	 13	of	30
Consumer	Experience	 	 Stability
Navigators	 3	of	5	 Ongoing	Monitoring	 0	of	3
Rating	Tools	 2	of	5	 Prohibitions	on		 3	of	5
Eligibility	and		 5	of	5	 Steering	
Enrollment	Systems	 	 Restrictions	on	 4	of	5	
Privacy	Protections	 0	of	5	 Off-Exchange	Plans
Language	Access	 2	of	5	 Financing	 1	of	2
TOTAL	 12	of	25	 TOTAL	 8	of	15	
TOTAL	SCORE:	B+	(54	of	95)
2 Making the Grade
high-value coverage, the establishing 
legislation does not explicitly direct the 
exchange to use this power to advance 
delivery and payment reforms that can 
lower costs while improving quality. With 
that said, the exchange’s recent hiring of an 
executive director with particular expertise 
in developing such reforms is an encourag-
ing sign, suggesting that it does intend to 
pursue these approaches.23
As a final note, California’s approach to 
standardization of products is somewhat 
unique. The exchange by statute has the 
power to standardize the products it offers, 
and if it does so, then insurers offering 
coverage outside of the exchange must 
offer a standardized product at each of the 
four tiers of value (bronze, silver, gold, and 
platinum). Because not all products off of 
the exchange will be standardized, even 
if the exchange exercises this power, we 
award three points for this criterion.24
Colorado
Colorado enacted Senate Bill 11-200 in 
the summer of 2011, with the legislature 
approving it on a bipartisan basis.25 The 
law is fairly short, and is primarily con-
cerned with setting out the governance 
and structure of the exchange. It appears 
to contemplate further legislative action, 
as it also creates a legislative oversight 
committee that is authorized to report 
legislation in support of the exchange, and 
which must review the exchange’s finan-
cial and operational plans. As a result, we 
have scored it only in that area (not scoring 
the question of what size businesses will 
Table	6.	Colorado	Scorecard
Governance	and	Overall	Structure	 Negotiating	Power	and	Driving	Value	
Exchange	Structure	 5	of	5	 Active	Purchaser	 0	of	10		
Board	Makeup	 1	of	8	 Delivery/Payment	 N/S	
Conflicts	of	Interest	 3	of	5	 Reforms	
Transparency	 0	of	2	 Rate	Review	 3	of	5
Size	of	Exchange	 N/S	 Standardization		 N/S
Stakeholder	Input	 0	of	2	 of	Products	
TOTAL	 9	of	22	 TOTAL	 3	of	15
Consumer	Experience	 	 Stability
Navigators	 N/S	 Ongoing	Monitoring	 N/S
Rating	Tools	 N/S	 Prohibitions	on		 N/S	
Eligibility	and		 N/S	 Steering	
Enrollment	Systems	 	 Restrictions	on	 N/S	
Privacy	Protections	 N/S	 Off-Exchange	Plans
Language	Access	 N/S	 Financing	 N/S
TOTAL	 N/S	 TOTAL	 N/S
TOTAL	SCORE:	C	(12	of	37)
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be eligible for the exchange, as the bill 
requires the exchange to study and issue a 
report on that question), and on the active 
purchasing criterion, as the law specifically 
says the exchange shall not “solicit bids or 
engage in the active purchasing of insur-
ance.”26
Unfortunately, even on these limited 
criteria, Colorado ranks low. In addition to 
the prohibition on the exchange leverag-
ing the negotiating power of its enrollees 
through active purchasing, the other major 
weakness of the exchange is that industry 
representatives are allowed to serve on 
the board. The only protection is that a 
majority of the board cannot be “directly 
affiliated with the insurance industry,” but 
insurers are allowed to be represented, and 
could combine with other industry inter-
ests to form a majority bloc. As a result, 
there is a real risk that Colorado’s exchange 
could be co-opted by those with a financial 
stake in its decisions, and be unaccountable 
to its enrollees, consumers generally, and 
the public.
Connecticut
Connecticut’s SB 921, enacted over the 
summer of 2011, sets out a comprehensive 
framework for its state’s exchange.27 In 
many respects it is similar to California’s 
exchange, and likewise offers a strong mod-
el for other states to consider following. 
It bans a comprehensive array of industry 
representatives from serving on the board, 
and has strong active purchaser author-
ity. However, again much like California, 
Connecticut did not specifically direct its 
exchange to use that power to promote 
delivery and payment reforms. 
Table	7.	Connecticut	Scorecard
Governance	and	Overall	Structure	 Negotiating	Power	and	Driving	Value	
Exchange	Structure	 5	of	5	 Active	Purchaser	 10	of	10		
Board	Makeup	 7	of	8	 Delivery/Payment	 0	of	10	
Conflicts	of	Interest	 5	of	5	 Reforms	
Transparency	 2	of	2	 Rate	Review	 3	of	5
Size	of	Exchange	 N/S	 Standardization		 0	of	5
Stakeholder	Input	 2	of	2	 of	Products	
TOTAL	 21	of	22	 TOTAL	 13	of	30
Consumer	Experience	 	 Stability
Navigators	 3	of	5	 Ongoing	Monitoring	 3	of	3
Rating	Tools	 2	of	5	 Prohibitions	on		 0	of	5
Eligibility	and		 5	of	5	 Steering	
Enrollment	Systems	 	 Restrictions	on	 0	of	5	
Privacy	Protections	 0	of	5	 Off-Exchange	Plans
Language	Access	 2	of	5	 Financing	 2	of	2
TOTAL	 12	of	25	 TOTAL	 5	of	15	
TOTAL	SCORE:	B+	(51	of	92)
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An additional area where Connecti-
cut could consider doing more is around 
adverse selection; on a positive note, the 
exchange is required to monitor the risk of 
adverse selection, and can make legislative 
recommendations, but the law does not 
impose any bans on insurer or broker steer-
ing, nor are there limits on the plans that 
may be offered outside of the exchange. 
The Connecticut exchange may wish to 
consider recommending such legislation 
under the monitoring provision, to ensure 
the stability of its risk pool.  
The law requires the exchange to report 
on whether to allow businesses above 50 
employees to participate, and so that cri-
terion is not scored. While the exchange 
does have the power to limit the number of 
products offered on the exchange, it is not 
clear that this provision would allow the ex-
change to standardize products, so we have 
not awarded points for that criterion.
Hawaii
Much like Colorado, Hawaii passed leg-
islation in the early summer of 2011 (SB 
1348) to establish the governance and basic 
structure of its exchange, while leaving 
most operational details for later imple-
mentation.28 The law establishes an interim 
exchange board that will recommend such 
implementing legislation in 2012. Accord-
ingly, we have not scored most areas outside 
of the governance and overall structure cri-
teria, except where the law makes a specific 
reference to another criterion.
Hawaii is so far unique in that it is the 
only state that has decided to create its ex-
change as a private non-profit corporation. 
As discussed in greater detail in the previ-
ous section, an exchange structured in this 
way may not be appropriately accountable 
to the public. This concern is exacerbated 
by the fact that industry representatives 
Table	8.	Hawaii	Scorecard
Governance	and	Overall	Structure	 Negotiating	Power	and	Driving	Value	
Exchange	Structure	 0	of	5	 Active	Purchaser	 0	of	10		
Board	Makeup	 1	of	8	 Delivery/Payment	 N/S	
Conflicts	of	Interest	 3	of	5	 Reforms	
Transparency	 1	of	2	 Rate	Review	 3	of	5
Size	of	Exchange	 N/S	 Standardization		 N/S
Stakeholder	Input	 0	of	2	 of	Products	
TOTAL	 5	of	22	 TOTAL	 3	of	15
Consumer	Experience	 	 Stability
Navigators	 N/S	 Ongoing	Monitoring	 N/S
Rating	Tools	 N/S	 Prohibitions	on		 N/S
Eligibility	and		 5	of	5	 Steering	
Enrollment	Systems	 	 Restrictions	on	 N/S	
Privacy	Protections	 N/S	 Off-Exchange	Plans
Language	Access	 2	of	5	 Financing	 1	of	2
TOTAL	 7	of	10	 TOTAL	 1	of	2
TOTAL	SCORE:	B-	(16	of	49)
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may serve on both the interim and final 
boards of the exchange (indeed, there are 
seats reserved for insurers and providers 
on the interim board), with no protec-
tions ensuring that they cannot constitute 
a majority. 
Further, like Colorado Hawaii pro-
hibits its exchange from being an active 
purchaser. While the unique characteris-
tics of Hawaii’s insurance market and its 
geographic isolation may have led policy-
makers to conclude that the ability of the 
state’s exchange to negotiate with insurers 
from a position of strength was limited, 
their denial of active purchasing authority 
means that even in future years, when the 
state’s market dynamics may have shifted, 
the exchange’s hands will still be tied absent 
further legislative action.
Maryland
Maryland’s Senate Bill 182 established its 
state exchange, passing in mid-2011, and 
as of this writing its board has already 
conducted several meetings.29 While 
the law is more comprehensive than the 
governance-only legislation pursued by 
several other states, it is also charged with 
making many different recommendations 
for later legislative or regulatory action, 
and the statute even specifically allows for 
the possibility that the exchange will later 
be reorganized into a private nonprofit. 
Accordingly, many areas are not scored for 
purposes of our ratings.
With that said, the governance struc-
ture laid out in the statute is quite strong, 
and the fact that Maryland’s exchange is 
closely studying so many important issues, 
Table	9.	Maryland	Scorecard
Governance	and	Overall	Structure	 Negotiating	Power	and	Driving	Value	
Exchange	Structure	 5	of	5	 Active	Purchaser	 N/S		
Board	Makeup	 7	of	8	 Delivery/Payment	 N/S	
Conflicts	of	Interest	 5	of	5	 Reforms	
Transparency	 2	of	2	 Rate	Review	 3	of	5
Size	of	Exchange	 N/S	 Standardization		 N/S
Stakeholder	Input	 2	of	2	 of	Products	
TOTAL	 21	of	22	 TOTAL	 3	of	5
Consumer	Experience	 	 Stability
Navigators	 N/S	 Ongoing	Monitoring	 N/S
Rating	Tools	 2	of	5	 Prohibitions	on		 N/S
Eligibility	and		 2	of	5	 Steering	
Enrollment	Systems	 	 Restrictions	on	 N/S	
Privacy	Protections	 N/S	 Off-Exchange	Plans
Language	Access	 N/S	 Financing	 1	of	2
TOTAL	 4	of	10	 TOTAL	 1	of	2
TOTAL	SCORE:	A	(29	of	39)
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including whether to use selective contract-
ing to drive payment and delivery reforms 
and how best to set rules for which plans 
may be offered on and off the exchange to 
protect against adverse selection, suggests 
that it may become a leading pro-consumer 
exchange once final action is taken on these 
recommendations.
Massachusetts
Massachusetts enacted its own com-
prehensive health care reform in 2006, 
which included many of the elements of 
the later federal reform, including its own 
state exchange, called the Connector.30 
The Connector has been operational and 
selling insurance to enrollees since 2007. 
While it has initiated a transition process, 
including stakeholder involvement, to 
plan changes needed to bring it fully into 
compliance with the new federal law, the 
Connector served in large measure as the 
template for the exchanges contemplated 
by the federal reform, and it is thus pos-
sible to rank it on the same criteria we use 
for other states.31
The Connector board has seats allocated 
to specific interests, including a broker, but 
industry cannot command a majority, so 
we assign four points on the board makeup 
criterion. Insurers and their representatives 
may not serve on the board, but there are 
no specific conflict-of-interest provisions 
beyond this.
There are two coverage programs run 
by the Connector: Commonwealth Care, 
for individual enrollees whose income 
qualifies them for state subsidies, and Com-
monwealth Choice for those not eligible 
Table	10.	Massachusetts	Scorecard
Governance	and	Overall	Structure	 Negotiating	Power	and	Driving	Value	
Exchange	Structure	 5	of	5	 Active	Purchaser	 10	of	10		
Board	Makeup	 4	of	8	 Delivery/Payment	 N/S	
Conflicts	of	Interest	 0	of	5	 Reforms	
Transparency	 2	of	2	 Rate	Review	 3	of	5
Size	of	Exchange	 0	of	3	 Standardization		 3	of	5
Stakeholder	Input	 2	of	2	 of	Products	
TOTAL	 13	of	25	 TOTAL	 16	of	20
Consumer	Experience	 	 Stability
Navigators	 N/S	 Ongoing	Monitoring	 N/S
Rating	Tools	 5	of	5	 Prohibitions	on		 N/S
Eligibility	and		 5	of	5	 Steering	
Enrollment	Systems	 	 Restrictions	on	 N/S	
Privacy	Protections	 3	of	5	 Off-Exchange	Plans
Language	Access	 2	of	5	 Financing	 N/S
TOTAL	 15	of	20	 TOTAL	 N/S
TOTAL	SCORE:	A-	(44	of	65)
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for subsidies and small businesses. Both 
engage in active purchasing activities, 
though Commonwealth Care has generally 
followed a selective contracting model of 
soliciting bids from participating insurers 
to meet specific statutory requirements, 
while Commonwealth Choice has followed 
a less formal model of standard-setting and 
individual back-and-forth. For purposes of 
the scorecard, we assign ten points, as the 
Connector explicitly considers value as a 
part of its activities.32
The Connector has recently moved to 
standardize the products it offers, so we 
assign three points for this criterion (prod-
ucts sold on the outside market remain 
non-standardized).33 
The privacy policy posted on the 
Connector’s website notes that it prohibits 
sale of personal information, or use of it 
for any purpose except those required for 
Connector purposes; as such, we award 
three points.34
Massachusetts is currently engaging in 
an effort to institute large-scale payment 
reform across all state payers. Presumably 
the Connector will play a role in those 
plans, but until they are enacted, we do not 
assign a score for this criterion.
The Connector legislation does not 
contain any provisions aimed at address-
ing the risk of adverse selection. This 
is partly an artifact of the state’s unique 
situation—prior to the passage of its 2006 
reform, it had required insurers to offer 
coverage on a guaranteed issue basis, even 
to patients with pre-existing conditions. 
Thus, its individual market risk pool was 
skewed towards less healthy, more expen-
sive enrollees. The state’s individual man-
date requirement, which went into effect in 
2007, was thus one of the most important 
Table	11.	Nevada	Scorecard
Governance	and	Overall	Structure	 Negotiating	Power	and	Driving	Value	
Exchange	Structure	 5	of	5	 Active	Purchaser	 N/S	
Board	Makeup	 2	of	8	 Delivery/Payment	 N/S	
Conflicts	of	Interest	 0	of	5	 Reforms	
Transparency	 1	of	2	 Rate	Review	 N/S
Size	of	Exchange	 0	of	3	 Standardization		 N/S
Stakeholder	Input	 0	of	2	 of	Products	
TOTAL	 8	of	25	 TOTAL	 N/S
Consumer	Experience	 	 Stability
Navigators	 N/S	 Ongoing	Monitoring	 N/S
Rating	Tools	 N/S	 Prohibitions	on		 N/S
Eligibility	and		 N/S	 Steering	
Enrollment	Systems	 	 Restrictions	on	 N/S	
Privacy	Protections	 N/S	 Off-Exchange	Plans
Language	Access	 N/S	 Financing	 N/S
TOTAL	 N/S	 TOTAL	 N/S
TOTAL	SCORE:	C	(8	of	25)
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measures to mitigate adverse selection 
across the entire marketplace.35 Because 
of these considerations, we do not assign 
a score for the Stability category, though 
with the passage of the federal reform, 
Massachusetts policymakers may wish to 
consider whether additional policies in this 
area are needed. 
Nevada 
Nevada’s SB 440 is a short statute that 
primarily concerns itself with creating the 
exchange’s governance; the exchange board 
will submit a plan for full implementation 
to the legislature by the end of 2011.36 As 
such, we have not evaluated the Nevada ex-
change on criteria outside the governance 
and structure area.
Representatives of the health insurance 
industry are barred from serving on the ex-
change board, but other industry interests, 
such as brokers or providers, may do so. Fur-
ther, there are no specific conflict of interest 
protections included in the law, which may 
pose difficulties if industry representatives 
are appointed to the board. As currently 
established, the governance of Nevada’s 
exchange risks being unaccountable to con-
sumer interests, thus its low grade.
Notably, unlike several other states that 
have pursued the governance-only route, 
SB 440 is silent on the question of whether 
Nevada’s exchange shall ultimately be per-
mitted to exercise its negotiating power as 
an active purchaser.
Oregon
Oregon’s exchange legislation, SB 99 of 
2011, was the result of a mult i-year 
initiative to reform the state’s health care 
system.37 The statute is comprehensive, 
addressing many aspects of the state’s ex-
change, though it is not the final word: the 
exchange must develop a formal business 
plan and submit it for legislative approval 
before it may open its doors.
The governing board of the exchange is 
open to industry representatives, including 
insurers, but they are limited to holding at 
most two seats on the nine-member board; 
two seats are also reserved for consumer 
representatives. Thus, we assign four 
points on this criterion—Oregon’s score 
would be improved if industry represen-
tatives were barred, and if the conflict of 
interest protections in the law required 
board members with a conflict of interest 
to recuse themselves from discussion as 
well as voting.
The extent of active purchasing author-
ity granted under the Oregon law remains 
somewhat unclear. The exchange does have 
the power to limit the number of plans of-
fered on the exchange, so long as that limit 
is applied uniformly to all insurers; simi-
larly, it may set additional standards and 
criteria for participating plans, which also 
must be uniform. This legislative language 
appears to make it more difficult for the 
state exchange to engage in individual ne-
gotiation or selective contracting with in-
surers, and so we assign five points. Along 
similar lines, the exchange is directed to 
“encourage” new delivery and payment 
reforms, but not explicitly to require them, 
again meaning that we assign five points. 
Oregon’s exchange would be stronger if 
these two provisions were broadened.
There is little in the statute that ad-
dresses the danger of adverse selection, 
meaning that Oregon policymakers should 
carefully consider whether additional ac-
tion is necessary in this area. And beyond 
their impact on adverse selection, the 
financing provisions of the statute may 
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prove problematic; not only is the exchange 
barred from assessing a fee on insurers 
that do not participate in the exchange, 
but the law also imposes caps on the fees 
the exchange is permitted to collect. This 
limitation may ultimately make it more 
difficult for the exchange to be financially 
stable and self-supporting.
Finally, our ratings include two other 
bills passed in Oregon’s 2011 legislative 
session that will have a bearing on the state 
exchange. SB 91 requires insurers doing 
business in the state to offer bronze and 
silver plans in any market in which they 
do businesses, and also requires all cata-
strophic plans to be sold on the exchange 
rather than the outside market.38 As a 
result, we assign two points for the limi-
tations on plans sold off of the exchange 
criterion. Similarly, SB 89 establishes a 
standardized bronze-level health benefit 
plan, so we award a single point for the 
standardization criterion.39
Rhode Island
Rhode Island was the first state to establish 
its exchange via executive order, in the fall 
of 2011.40 As of this writing, board mem-
bers had recently been appointed. While 
the executive order is brief, it is reason-
ably comprehensive in the issues that it 
addresses, and thus we score it on each of 
our criteria. 
The governance of the Rhode Island ex-
change is generally strong. The significant 
weak point is that while industry interests 
are barred from serving on the board, 
Table	12.Oregon	Scorecard
Governance	and	Overall	Structure	 Negotiating	Power	and	Driving	Value	
Exchange	Structure	 5	of	5	 Active	Purchaser	 5	of	10		
Board	Makeup	 4	of	8	 Delivery/Payment	 5	of	10	
Conflicts	of	Interest	 3	of	5	 Reforms	
Transparency	 1	of	2	 Rate	Review	 3	of	5
Size	of	Exchange	 0	of	3	 Standardization		 1	of	5
Stakeholder	Input	 2	of	2	 of	Products	
TOTAL	 15	of	25	 TOTAL	 14	of	30
Consumer	Experience	 	 Stability
Navigators	 5	of	5	 Ongoing	Monitoring	 0	of	3
Rating	Tools	 2	of	5	 Prohibitions	on		 0	of	5
Eligibility	and		 2	of	5	 Steering	
Enrollment	Systems	 	 Restrictions	on	 2	of	5	
Privacy	Protections	 0	of	5	 Off-Exchange	Plans
Language	Access	 2	of	5	 Financing	 0	of	2
TOTAL	 11	of	25	 TOTAL	 2	of	15
TOTAL	SCORE:	B-	(42	of	95)
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there are no specific conflict of interest 
protections in the event that a member 
does have a personal interest implicated 
in a particular decision. On negotiation, 
the picture is also strong, as the executive 
order empowers the exchange to engage in 
selective contracting, charges it to pursue 
payment reforms aligned with efforts of 
other payers in the state, and allows it to 
standardize products. 
The Rhode Island exchange is com-
paratively weak on criteria having to do 
with the consumer experience and stability 
and protection against adverse selection. 
This may be because some of the required 
changes, especially around adverse selec-
tion, would have to be instituted via statute 
rather than executive order. Rhode Island’s 
policymakers should closely examine 
whether legislation should be pursued in 
these areas, so that its exchange can match 
in these areas its high performance on 
governance and negotiating power.
Vermont
The bill creating Vermont’s exchange, 
2011’s HB 202, has to do with much more 
than simply the state’s new exchange.41 It 
is the first step in a comprehensive plan 
to reform the state’s health care system, 
which is planned to ultimately integrate 
all state payers into a single-payer system. 
As a result, Vermont’s exchange is unique 
on many levels; it will be run by the ex-
isting state government agencies (albeit 
with input from an advisory committee 
of stakeholders), and it will be used as the 
foundation for the eventual single-payer 
Table	13.	Rhode	Island	Scorecard
Governance	and	Overall	Structure	 Negotiating	Power	and	Driving	Value	
Exchange	Structure	 5	of	5	 Active	Purchaser	 10	of	10
Board	Makeup	 7	of	8	 Delivery/Payment	 8	of	10
Conflicts	of	Interest	 0	of	5	 Reforms	
Transparency	 2	of	2	 Rate	Review	 3	of	5
Size	of	Exchange	 0	of	3	 Standardization		 3	of	5
Stakeholder	Input	 0	of	2	 of	Products	
TOTAL	 14	of	25	 TOTAL	 24	of	130
Consumer	Experience	 	 Stability
Navigators	 3	of	5	 Ongoing	Monitoring	 1	of	3
Rating	Tools	 0	of	5	 Prohibitions	on		 0	of	5
Eligibility	and		 2	of	5	 Steering	
Enrollment	Systems	 	 Restrictions	on	 0	of	5	
Privacy	Protections	 0	of	5	 Off-Exchange	Plans
Language	Access	 0	of	5	 Financing	 1	of	2
TOTAL	 5	of	25	 TOTAL	 2	of	15
TOTAL	SCORE:	B	(45	of	95)
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system. With that said, it is not difficult to 
compare Vermont’s exchange with those 
established in other states, as there are 
only a few places where its unique approach 
renders our methodology inapplicable.
One place where our usual rating ap-
proach does not work is when it comes to 
board composition and conflict of interest 
rules; as the exchange will be run as part 
of a state agency, we do not score these 
criteria. Several issues, such as what size 
employers will buy coverage through 
the exchange, are explicitly reserved for 
future decision, and so we do not score 
them either.
All told, Vermont’s exchange plan is 
quite strong; while its governance score 
is comparatively low, in large measure 
this reflects the fact that its exchange is 
an integrated part of a comprehensive 
state reform plan. While this means the 
exchange will not be independent of state 
policy decisions, in the context of a broad 
transition to a single-payer system, such 
independence could be a double-edged 
sword. The incorporation of delivery and 
payment reforms into the active-pur-
chasing exchange means that Vermont 
exchange enrollees will see their negotiat-
ing power put to good use. More could be 
done to guard the exchange against adverse 
selection, however, especially as limitations 
on steering and monitoring the risk pool 
could be important to the overall success 
of a single-payer plan.
Table	14.	Vermont	Scorecard
Governance	and	Overall	Structure	 Negotiating	Power	and	Driving	Value	
Exchange	Structure	 2	of	5	 Active	Purchaser	 10	of	10		
Board	Makeup	 N/S	 Delivery/Payment	 10	of	10	
Conflicts	of	Interest	 N/S	 Reforms	
Transparency	 1	of	2	 Rate	Review	 3	of	5
Size	of	Exchange	 N/S	 Standardization		 0	of	5
Stakeholder	Input	 2	of	2	 of	Products	
TOTAL	 5	of	9	 TOTAL	 23	of	30
Consumer	Experience	 	 Stability
Navigators	 3	of	5	 Ongoing	Monitoring	 0	of	3
Rating	Tools	 2	of	5	 Prohibitions	on		 0	of	5
Eligibility	and		 5	of	5	 Steering	
Enrollment	Systems	 	 Restrictions	on	 N/S	
Privacy	Protections	 0	of	5	 Off-Exchange	Plans
Language	Access	 	2	of	5	 Financing	 N/S
TOTAL	 12	of	25	 TOTAL	 0	of	8
TOTAL	SCORE:	B+	(40	of	72)
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Washington
The Washington legislation creating its 
exchange, SB 5445, is primarily concerned 
with governance and structure.42 Similar to 
other states, Washington has charged its 
exchange with making recommendations 
for further state action in several areas, 
including whether to have the exchange act 
as an active purchaser, whether all Naviga-
tors should be brokers, whether it should 
participate in delivery and payment reform 
efforts, and how to structure the exchange’s 
financing. Therefore, we follow our prac-
tice of primarily judging it on governance 
criteria, and not scoring areas where future 
state action is anticipated.
On these limited selection of policies, 
Washington’s exchange appears strongly 
pro-consumer. No person with a conflict of 
interest may serve on the exchange board, 
and in the event such a conflict of inter-
est does arise, they must immediately be 
dismissed. As of yet, however, it is unclear 
whether this provision will ultimately be 
used to disqualify all potential members 
with an industry affiliation, or simply those 
directly employed by insurers. 
Hopefully, Washington will maintain 
its current high rating once it takes action 
on the numerous questions deferred by SB 
5445 for future action.
West Virginia
The final state to act so far to create its 
exchange is West Virginia, which did so 
via SB 408, passed into law in the spring of 
2011.43 The statute is a clear “governance-
only” law, and does not address issues 
Table	15.	Washington	Scorecard
Governance	and	Overall	Structure	 Negotiating	Power	and	Driving	Value	
Exchange	Structure	 5	of	5	 Active	Purchaser	 N/S		
Board	Makeup	 4	of	8	 Delivery/Payment	 N/S	
Conflicts	of	Interest	 5	of	5	 Reforms	
Transparency	 1	of	2	 Rate	Review	 3	of	5
Size	of	Exchange	 N/S	 Standardization		 N/S
Stakeholder	Input	 2	of	2	 of	Products	
TOTAL	 17	of	22	 TOTAL	 3	of	5
Consumer	Experience	 	 Stability
Navigators	 N/S	 Ongoing	Monitoring	 N/S
Rating	Tools	 N/S	 Prohibitions	on		 N/S
Eligibility	and		 N/S	 Steering	
Enrollment	Systems	 	 Restrictions	on	 N/S	
Privacy	Protections	 N/S	 Off-Exchange	Plans
Language	Access	 N/S	 Financing	 N/S
TOTAL	 N/S	 TOTAL	 N/S
TOTAL	SCORE:	A	(20	of	27)
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outside of the structure of the exchange’s 
board and a few details of its financing. 
The board will include one representative 
of insurance producers, one of providers, 
and one of payers. Individual consumers, 
small businesses, and organized labor are 
also represented, with the remaining slots 
on the board filled by state officials. 
The question of whether the West 
Virginia exchange will be an active pur-
chaser appears to be left unaddressed by 
SB 408. There is a provision prohibiting 
the exchange from entering into contracts 
with health insurers that would make it 
difficult for the exchange to engage in se-
lective contracting, but as it is not yet clear 
whether the exchange would be allowed 
to set certification standards or otherwise 
be an active purchaser, we have not scored 
this criterion.
While a reasonable start, much more 
work will need to be done to fully estab-
lish and operationalize West Virginia’s 
exchange.
Table	16.	West	Virginia	Scorecard
Governance	and	Overall	Structure	 Negotiating	Power	and	Driving	Value	
Exchange	Structure	 5	of	5	 Active	Purchaser	 N/S		
Board	Makeup	 4	of	8	 Delivery/Payment	 N/S	
Conflicts	of	Interest	 0	of	5	 Reforms	
Transparency	 0	of	2	 Rate	Review	 3	of	5
Size	of	Exchange	 0	of	3	 Standardization		 N/S
Stakeholder	Input	 2	of	2	 of	Products	
TOTAL	 11	of	25	 TOTAL	 3	of	5
Consumer	Experience	 	 Stability
Navigators	 N/S	 Ongoing	Monitoring	 N/S
Rating	Tools	 N/S	 Prohibitions	on		 N/S
Eligibility	and		 N/S	 Steering	
Enrollment	Systems	 	 Restrictions	on	 N/S	
Privacy	Protections	 N/S	 Off-Exchange	Plans
Language	Access	 N/S	 Financing	 N/S
TOTAL	 N/S	 TOTAL	 N/S
TOTAL	SCORE:	B	(14	of	30)
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In contrast to the states examined in the previous chapter, many other states have yet to take action to create their 
exchange. Rather than giving them let-
ter grades, their status must be marked as 
Incomplete, as they have not yet made the 
decisions necessary to judge whether or not 
their exchange will be pro-consumer—or, 
indeed, whether the state itself will run the 
exchange, or if the federal government will 
step in to establish it. This section briefly 
summarizes the status of exchange creation 
efforts in the remaining states. 44
In general, most states are pursuing the 
creation of their own exchange, or at least 
are exploring the tradeoffs of running it 
themselves as against leaving its opera-
tion to the federal government. Only two 
states appear to have entirely rejected the 
idea of creating an exchange—Louisiana 
and Florida. This is a positive trend, but 
at the same time, the fact that so many 
states have yet to make significant prog-
ress on their exchange is cause for some 
concern. 
There will be many policy decisions that 
must be made, and much infrastructure 
that must be created, to ensure that the 
exchange is open and ready to do business 
in 2014. With the states that have already 
taken action providing a guide to the 
choices states have available to them, it’s 
past time for those states that have yet to set 
up their exchange to get the ball rolling.
Study Committees or  
Official Intent
A number of states have not formally es-
tablished an exchange, but have taken some 
action to begin the process: either they 
have convened legislative or administrative 
study committees to make formal recom-
mendations for government action, or they 
have officially established their intent to 
create a state level exchange.
These states include Alabama, Georgia, 
Indiana,45 and South Carolina, all of which 
have proceeded via executive order. States 
that have passed intent or study committee 
legislation include Illinois, Maine, Mis-
sissippi, Montana, North Dakota, Utah, 
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Virginia, and Wyoming, for a combined 
twelve states in total.
Not all of these states are in the same 
place. Utah, for example, created its own 
small business exchange before the pas-
sage of the federal law. The study legisla-
tion the state passed this year will begin 
the process of reforming that existing 
exchange to bring it into compliance with 
the federal law’s requirements.46 With an 
existing foundation to build on, hopefully 
the state will find it easy to quickly set up 
its exchange. Similarly, as of this writing 
Illinois’ study committee has just issued 
its report to the legislature, and some 
leaders are pressing for legislative action 
this year. 
Other states in this category have more 
work to do. But they have made a start 
on establishing their own exchanges, and 
we look forward to evaluating the result-
ing proposals in a future edition of this 
report.
States Not Pursuing  
an Exchange
As discussed above, only two states appear 
to have definitively disclaimed their intent 
to create a state exchange. In Louisiana, 
Governor Jindal has stated that they will 
allow the federal government to run their 
state’s exchange. In Florida, Governor Scott 
has persistently opposed the health reform 
law, and his administration has expressed 
its intent to return the federal planning 
grant they received to help establish their 
exchange (though as of this writing, they 
had not yet returned the money). As such, it 
is likely that a federally-facilitated exchange 
will be set up in each of these states.
Action Pending
In twenty-four additional states, and 
the District of Columbia, action on a 
state exchange is pending. All of these 
states, save Alaska,47 have applied for 
and received planning grants to assist in 
this process. 
As with states that have passed study 
committees or officially committed to 
creating an exchange, these states are at 
widely different places in the process. 
For example, as of this writing, leaders in 
New Jersey are still considering exchange 
legislation, which may pass this year. In 
New Mexico, Governor Martinez vetoed 
legislation that would have created a state 
exchange, but has endorsed the idea of the 
state running its own. Exchange legislation 
failed in Arizona this year, but the state’s 
executive branch is pursuing the creation 
of an exchange, potentially without legisla-
tive action.
In other states, there are only vague 
stakeholder informat ion-gather ing 
Alaska	 New	Hampshire
Arizona	 New	Jersey
Arkansas	 New	Mexico
Delaware	 New	York
Florida	*	 North	Carolina
Idaho	 Ohio
Iowa	 Oklahoma
Kansas	 Pennsylvania
Kentucky	 South	Dakota	
Louisiana	*	 Tennessee
Michigan	 Texas
Minnesota	 Washington,	D.C.
Missouri	 Wisconsin
Nebraska	 	
States	with	asterisks	have	indicated	that	they	
will	not	create	a	state	exchange.
Table	17.	”Incomplete”:	States	Yet	to		
Take	Action	to	Create	an	Exchange
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processes in place, and state leaders may 
have gone on the record as opposing 
the creation of the exchange. Similarly, 
meeting the timetable of establishing an 
exchange that can be operational by 2014 
will be made more difficult in some states 
due to the fact that their legislatures will 
not meet in 2012, meaning that a special 
legislative session or unilateral executive 
branch action will be needed to create a 
state exchange. 
Still, in most of these states, the leg-
islature has introduced and considered 
bills establishing an exchange. And as this 
report demonstrates, the quick action of 
other states means that those that have yet 
to act have at their disposal several cred-
ible models and pieces of actual legislation. 
With sufficient political will, all of these 
states should be able to quickly erase the 
“Incomplete” from their transcript and set 
up an exchange.
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